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I.

INTRODUCTION

My first opportunity to read John Hart Ely's ideas on war powers
came in 1988, when he published the antecedent of one chapter of War
and Responsibility as an article in the Columbia Law Review titled Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked.' The punctuation-without a question mark-makes an important point: The verb
"suppose" invites us not to speculate about a counterfactual hypothetical, but rather to assume that Congress must want its own creation to
work. Professor Ely's project was to show Congress how to fix it.
But it was already evident in 1988, and had been for some time,
that Congress did not want a War Powers Act that really worked.
Indeed, the dominant legislative proposal at that time, known as the
Nunn-Byrd-Warner bill,2 would have improved the fit between congressional prescription and executive behavior by relaxing the strictures of
the War Powers Resolution.3 Current proposals would improve that fit
more forthrightly, simply by repealing the Resolution.4 It was also evident then that Congress didn't-and apparently still doesn't-want to
discharge the responsibilities concerning war and peace conferred upon
Congress by the Constitution. Hence in War and Responsibility, as in
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. This essay forms part of a larger research project
and is intended as a preview of work in progress. The author acknowledges the Columbia Law
School's program of grants in support of faculty research for material assistance in this project.
1. John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1379 (1988).
2. See S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1988 & Supp. 1991)).
4. See, e.g., S. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a) ("The War Powers Resolution . . . is
repealed.").
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his earlier article, Professor Ely devotes considerable thought to the
notion of forcing (or at least inducing) Congress to live up to its constitutional responsibilities.5
Many of us regret that Professor Ely's ideas have not been taken
more seriously by the most important audience for which they were
intended, namely the U.S. Congress. Congress, however, is not the only
audience that needs to hear his message. The message of War and
Responsibility should be the topic of conferences not only in Miami or
Washington, but also in Buenos Aires, Lima, Quito, Tokyo, Bonn/Berlin, Rome, Ankara, Pretoria, and maybe even Minsk or Moscow.
Taking the message of War and Responsibility to foreign audiences
would link Professor Ely's ideas to an equally ambitious project (of
which our colleague Professor Louis Henkin is a leading exponent)the spreading of the best of American constitutionalism to foreign lands.
Indeed, just about the time that Professor Ely was publishing his article
in the Columbia Law Review, an intellectual event celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution was also taking place at Columbia Law
School. There, under Professor Henkin's direction, scholars from
around the world were exploring the Constitution's influence abroad.6
That investigation did not extend to the Constitution's war powers
clauses, but it is my project to take the inquiry in that direction. There is
reason to explore the possibility that the American experiment of constitutional control over war power, even while remaining controversial in
concept and implementation with respect to contemporary U.S. military
involvements, has generated trends outside the United States toward
subordinating executive warmaking to constitutional control. In places
where this American constitutional idea did fall on fertile soil, significant advances have been made toward constraining the initiation of military conflict.
The argument I propose to make-and I would like to enlist Professor Ely in the effort both to make it and to strengthen the empirical
basis for it-is that around the world, in constitutional democracies
everywhere, we see a borrowing of what was an American innovation in
1787. That idea is the Madisonian one (elaborated upon as well by other
eighteenth-century thinkers and leaders) of committing the most solemn
national decision, the decision to go to war, not to one person or even
one body of persons, but rather to the shared judgment of two branches,
with the Legislative branch having the ultimate say.
5. See JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:

CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM

AND ITS AFTERMATH, 47-67 (1993).
6. See generally CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
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All constitutional democracies have had to grapple with the fundamental problem of determining when national military power should be
committed to situations of actual or potential conflict. To date, however,
legal scholarship on war powers-Professor Ely's and everyone
else's-has addressed only single national systems. The present symposium is no exception, for the only mention of other countries' legal systems has come in Professor Bernard Oxman's comments addressed to
the problem of fashioning a United Nations security system that can
function efficiently (and in that context, parliamentary involvement was
portrayed as a potential impediment to collective decisionmaking).7
What is lacking is a crossnational, crossdisciplinary analysis of
war-and-peace decisionmaking as a challenge to democratic theory and
constitutionalism. A comparative understanding of constitutionalism
and war powers can show that for all their many differences, constitutional democracies do share certain basic commitments that distinguish
them from other forms of government and notably affect their decisionmaking processes in the military sphere. As more and more polities
undergo democratic transformation, the identification and consolidation
of a common core of democratic accountability in the war-and-peace
sphere will take on ever-increasing significance.
My central argument is that the body of experience of the mature
democracies in their war-and-peace decisions reflects a common core of
commitment to democratic accountability. The techniques of accountability surely do vary-some techniques are embodied in written constitutions and other formal instruments, while others are unwritten or
informal; some entail greater and others lesser degrees of legislative
supervision; some are before-the-fact and others after-the-fact; some do
and some do not include control through constitutional courts or other
judicial bodies. For all their differences, however, constitutional democracies share certain basic values as well as a common interest in transplanting those values to other polities where they are not yet entrenched.
My project seeks to understand what is common among the democracies and what is not, as well as what is transferable and what is not.
Thus, while I proceed from the assumption (already validated by consid7. Professor Oxman is concerned that a second level of deliberations in national legislatures
could delay and possibly derail or prevent collective action. Bernard H. Oxman, The Relevance of
the InternationalOrder to the Allocation of Internal Powers to Use Force, 50 U. MiAmi L. REv.
129, 139-41 (1995). This concern deserves serious consideration, going beyond what is feasible

in the scope of this comment. In some constitutional systems (including in the United States,
although Professor Ely might not agree, cf ELY, supra note 5, at 54-60), the difficulty could be
addressed by conferring advance authorization through standing legislation. In other
constitutional systems, however, such as the German and Japanese systems discussed at notes 3352 infra, a fresh legislative decision is required to validate each specific commitment to participate
in international peacekeeping.
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erable literature) that expansion of communities committed to democratic governance correlates with expansion of domestic and
international peace,' I do not argue that the details of the American form
of constitutionalism are necessarily the best model for polities in transition to adopt. A major objective of the research is to understand what
aspects of the American experience are unique and what aspects are
generalizable.
What can we in the United States learn from the experience of other
constitutional democracies? With typically American missionary fervor,
we have often sought to impose our own vision of constitutionalism on
others; some "transplants" took, but others did not. Too often, however,
Americans deny or fail to perceive the possibility that the legal systems
of other countries could have any relevance for our own. The American
experience is in many respects unique. However, through a better
understanding of what is common to and what is different among constitutional democracies, we may not only be able to make wiser choices
within our own constitutional system, but also be able to reach some
generalizations about the transferability of our successes to other polities
that are going through constitutional transformation.
II.

WHY A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF WAR POWER?

The intrinsic interest of a comparative study of constitutionalism
and war perhaps needs no further defense or apology. However, in view
of widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of law in regulating the
use of force, I would like to make several claims about the value of a
comparative legal study of this subject, not only for its own sake but also
in the service of widely shared objectives. 9 The international community does indeed have a major stake in the constitutional evolution of
member states as regards the authority to decide to go to war. That
stake, or rather those multiple interests, are to:
(1) Strengthen trends toward constitutionalism generally, by
which I mean the concept of governance based on law;
(2) Strengthen trends toward civilian control over military
forces;
(3) Support the adoption of constitutional safeguards governing
war powers, so as to reduce the possibility of international conflict;
(4) Ensure that states are in a position to fulfill their responsibil8. The literature exploring the "democratic peace" (or "interdemocratic peace") hypothesis
is by now voluminous. For a glimpse at some of the aspects of this literature of interest to
lawyers, see infra text at notes 20-28.

9. I draw here on my comment titled Constitutional Control of Military Actions: A
Comparative Dimension, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 92 (1991).
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ities under international treaties, including those concerning collective defense and collective security;
(5) Ensure that decisions concerning the use of force within an
international system of collective security are made on a rational and
responsible basis.' °

I will not pause here to defend the assertion of a shared interest in
strengthening constitutionalism in general, but rather will move to the

specific applications of constitutionalism to war powers-a sphere of
inquiry almost entirely ignored in comparative legal scholarship. This
vacuum is unfortunate. Although the "market" for comparative analysis
of domestic legal systems should and does include a demand for com-

parative understanding of the bodies of public law reflecting political
organization, governance structures, and relationships between government and polity, the supply of research in these areas is quite limited.
While excellent comparative legal studies exist in certain areas of public
law (for example, judicial review of legislative or executive action, and
protection of human rights), this literature leaves essentially unexplored
the problem of war-and-peace decisionmaking.
The absence of any significant comparative examination of constitutional control of war power may well reflect conventional wisdom that
laws on war are to be disregarded-or so one might infer if one's horizons are limited to American experiences of the past few decades, and

indeed so one might conclude from much of the discussion at this symposium.' If American constitutionalism has proved less than fully successful in the war powers field, then must one despair of the efficacy of
10. Id. at 93. These are not the only interests that might be advanced by a greater
understanding of the legal framework for military decisionmaking. I focus here on instrumental
applications. The primary objects of study in my project are the flourishing democracies, which
are likely to be allied with the United States in efforts to restrain or rebuff conflicts initiated by
others. An understanding of the decision-making processes of potential nondemocratic
adversaries could also have instrumental value in conflict prevention (for example, it was essential
during the Cold War to have as accurate an appreciation as possible of military decisionmaking
within the Kremlin); but those processes fall outside the scope of the present study.
Contributors to the democracy-and-peace literature have speculated that the relative
transparency of military decisionmaking in democratic societies could be one of the factors
decreasing the possibility of initiation or escalation of conflicts against those societies, because
misperception of their actual intentions is reduced. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28. If
this speculation has merit, then dissemination of a deeper understanding of the workings of
military decisionmaking within constitutional democracies could contribute to this conflictavoidance potential. Indeed, a fuller appreciation of parliamentary participation in defining the
interests worth fighting for could strengthen deterrence by enhancing the credibility of the military
commitments of democratic states.
11. Professors Glennon and Lobel stress the deviations of the practice of recent
administrations from constitutional and statutory requirements. See Michael J. Glennon, Too Far
Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MiAMi L. REV. 17 (1995); Jules Lobel, "Little
Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. MiAMi L. REV. 61 (1995).
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constitutional constraint of war across the board? Not at all. A principal
purpose of the research agenda I have in mind is to ask whether and how
constitutional control of war power can work in any democratic society,
with our own democratic society being just one example, and perhaps a
less-than-optimal one.
My hypothesis is that constitutional control of war power is not
only conceivable as an ideal, but is in fact operational and effective in
many diverse countries. In a variety of different democracies, constitutionalism works to ensure that representative organs, and ultimately the
people, participate in the processes for deciding on the polity's military
commitments. Where constitutionalism works, we should both recognize that fact and learn from it. What makes it work? Can it be made to
work in other countries, or in a wider range of circumstances? How can
its workings be improved within polities with established traditions of
constitutional control and in other polities that may draw on them as
models?
Not the least of the possible values of such an inquiry is as a source
of ideas for the constitutional reforms now underway in Eastern Europe,
the Americas, and elsewhere. Attention to constitutional control over
war power should be an important component of the strengthening
of democracy in Argentina and Turkey, which under previous regimes
resorted to war in an attempt to settle longrunning disputes (over the
Falklands/Malvinas and Cyprus, respectively). A balanced appreciation
of the limitations as well as the possibility of constitutional transplants
should inform any discussion of whether, for example, the U.S.-led multinational coalition (composed largely of forces from democratic countries) should have pursued more activist policies of attempting to impose
Western-style governance on Iraqi society after the Persian Gulf War of
1990_91.12

Above all, we must be attentive to th6 conditions that make constitutionalism, and constitutional transplants, take root and flourish in new
contexts, as well as to the factors tending toward the opposite effect. If,
for example, the renunciation-of-war clauses in the U.S.-imposed German and Japanese constitutions have worked and continue to structure
decisionmaking and political debate over those countries' military
undertakings even half a century later, then it is important to understand
both why the roots of the exotic plant took hold and whether the circumstances of success were so unusual as to preclude the possibility of a
12. Such an argument is made in ROBERT W. TUCKER & DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, THE
142-151 (1992) (arguing that the coalition should have pursued a military
occupation of Iraq, with a view toward reconstructing its political institutions as was done with
Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II).
IMPERIAL TEMvrATION
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further grafting onto other constitutional cultures. 3 Similar questions
can be asked about other apparent success stories, such as the constitutionalization of neutrality in post-war Austria.
Covert action is another sphere in which comparative constitutional
law can supply relevant insights. A decade ago, Stansfield Turner
pointed out that virtually all Western democracies (with the notable isolated exceptiofi of the United Kingdom) had moved toward legislative
supervision of intelligence activities.14 Former CIA directors, including
Turner, are among the most effective advocates for parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities. The efficacy of legislative oversight
obviously varies quite dramatically, both between different democracies
and within one democracy over time, as our own Iran-Contra affair
shows.1 5 Rudimentary oversight did not prevent France's Rainbow
Warrior affair, for example. But these difficulties in implementing the
concept of democratic control over secret services do not undercut the
value of scholarly comparative analysis, 6 or indeed of interparliamentary dialogue aimed at sharing experiences and learning from
them. 7 The important point is to identify and understand the common
trend across democratic societies to subject covert paramilitary activities
to parliamentary control.
The efforts of the post-Cold War period to redesign systems of collective defense and collective security in light of contemporary needs
show further applications for the comparative law of war powers. The
Persian Gulf War marks the start of the current phase of such efforts; the
Bosnian conflict (which continues as of this writing) illustrates the perplexities faced by democratic states that try to use multilateral military
force while their electorates remain deeply skeptical about being drawn
13. At the risk of overdoing my horticultural metaphors, I would also like to suggest that even
where there is no question of retransplanting back to the United States a plant with more than a

little U.S. parentage--for example, the German and Japanese models, which may be
transplantable to third countries but surely not back to the United States-some benefits from
cross-fertilization may still be available.

14.

STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY

179 (1985) (citing West Germany,

France, Italy, Australia, and Canada as countries that have all "taken steps to bring their
intelligence organizations under closer control of their political authorities," and predicting that
British intelligence would soon be similarly brought under oversight).
15. See generally HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR (1990).

16. I began my reflections on comparative control over intelligence activities when I
presented a paper on the U.S. experience in intelligence oversight to a conference in Bologna,
Italy, where I heard the views of Italian experts on whether the U.S. experience could shed light
on the much different problems facing Italian society. See Lori F. Damrosch, I1 controllo
democratico sui servizi segreti, in Democrazia e segreto (Raimondo Catanzaro ed., 1985).

17. Such efforts are underway under the auspices of, for example, the Lawmaking for
Democracy project of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security. See U.S. State Dep't Dispatch,
1993 WL 2977106, Aug. 9, 1993.
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into a foreign quagmire. Constitutional democracies likewise have had
to wrestle with whether to participate in U.N.-authorized operations in
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and elsewhere. The problem of constitutional
control over collective military action has been central to each of these
conflicts and has figured prominently in attention being given in the
1990s to devising new systems (which could be prepared in advance
rather than on an ad hoc basis for each new emergency) for collective
response to future crises.
The drafters of the U.N. Charter were aware that domestic constitutional requirements would affect the extent to which states could commit
national military forces to a collective security endeavor. In deference
to both constitutional and political sensitivities, Article 43 of the Charter
contemplates that national military units would be placed at the Security
Council's disposal on the basis of agreements to be negotiated between
states and the United Nations; such agreements would be subject to ratification by member states "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."' 8 When the U.S. Senate gave advice and consent to
ratification of the Charter, and when the U.S. Congress enacted the U.N.
Participation Act to implement the Charter, it was clearly understood
that the legislative organ with constitutional responsibility for deciding
to go to war-the Congress-would approve any agreement under Article 43; after such approval, the Executive branch could execute the
agreement.19 Although Article 43 fell victim to the Cold War and was
never activated, a revival of interest following the end of the Cold War
has led to several proposals for establishing the terms under which the
United Nations could draw on military forces committed to it in advance
by member states. For democratic states, a key issue in the consideration of any such proposals is the mechanism for ensuring a constitutionally sufficient decision to participate in such a system and in particular
uses of military force thereunder.
A comparative study of constitutional aspects of participation in
collective security arrangements shows that democratic states attach a
high value to preserving constitutional control over military action
within any multilateral framework, whether under the auspices of the
United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other body.
Far from being a hindrance, fidelity to national constitutional require18. U.N. Charter, art. 43, 3.
19. See United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287d) (stating that agreement under art. 43 "shall be subject to the
approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution"), discussed in Jane E. Stromseth,
Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President,and the UnitedNations, 81 GEO.L. J. 597, 615
(1993) and Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 78 (1991).
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ments is essential to the success of such arrangements. In particular, the
participation of the Legislative branch, to the extent required by national
constitutional law, should strengthen rather than undermine collective
military action.
III.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CONFLICT:

DOMESTIC FOUNDATIONS

OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE

The correlation between international peace and internal political
organization was developed as a philosophical and constitutional proposition more than two centuries ago. Immanuel Kant commonly receives
credit for the intellectual paternity of the philosophical linkage between
the two concepts in his essay To PerpetualPeace, published in 1795.20

James Madison and other American constitutionalists had already
expounded the notion that republics under popular control would be less
likely than kings to take their countries into war, 2' and that view found
juridical expression in the Constitution drafted at Philadelphia in 1787.22
The eighteenth-century argument stood in contradistinction to then-prevalent tyrannical-monarchical forms of political organization, which were
seen as more likely to drag the people into unwarranted, unwanted
hostilities.
Kant's insight has been the object of intensive research by twentieth-century political scientists, who in recent years have analyzed almost
two centuries' worth of wars between and among countries of differing
political structures, with the objective of understanding whether democratization promotes peace. The accumulated data and analysis provide a
starting point for moving beyond the effort to understand observable
phenomena toward a more explicit articulation of implications for constitutional decisionmaking.
The proposition is now firmly established that democracies virtually never go to war with each other; thus we now have empirical proof
of Kant's philosophical speculation about peaceful relations within a
league of democratic states-what some contemporary political scien20. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS

PERPETUAL

107-39 (Ted Humphrey trans.,

1983).

21. Madison wrote, for example, that the Constitution "supposes, what the History of all
Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it.
It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl." Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs, 12

PHIL.

& PUB. AFF. 205, 225 n.23 (citing Thomas Paine for the assertion that democracy

and war are incompatible).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
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tists call the theory of the "interdemocraticpeace."2 3 Yet the hypothesis
that democracies are inherently more pacific than nondemocracies has
not been empirically validated. To the contrary, the conventional wisdom is that the evidence tends to show that in their relations with
nondemocracies, democracies are just as violence-prone and perhaps
even just as likely to initiate conflict as other regimes.24 The evidence
on conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies, and especially
on democracies as initiators of conflicts against nondemocracies,
requires further consideration in order to arrive at a fair assessment of
the Madisonian claims of the war-restraining characteristics of the
American model of constitutional democracy.
The political science literature on the democracy-peace linkage is
not always attentive to questions of greatest interest to legal consumers
of this research. Political scientists have adopted different definitions of
"democracy" in their methodologies but have rarely attempted to ascertain whether, within the overall category of "democracies," there are
subtypes that have been more successful than others in avoiding violent
conflict. Although researchers have introduced some refinements of
arguable relevance to legal concerns, the information bearing on a comparative assessment of differing forms of democratic control of warmaking is not easy to tease out. Interdisciplinary dialogue between lawyers
and political scientists may help shed light on this question.
Michael W. Doyle (whose article set the tone for much of the
research of the past decade) erects a dichotomy between "liberal" and
"illiberal" regimes, with the former defined in terms of four basic attributes. One attribute is representative government, including "the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy"
and that "representative government is internally sovereign ( ...

espe-

affairs)."2

cially over military and foreign
Doyle takes some account of
the legislative role in formulating foreign policy. For example, he
excludes pre-World War I Germany from his catalogue of liberal states,
largely on the ground that the Kaiser's control of military policy was
unchecked by a legislature that otherwise had substantial policy-making
authority. Doyle, however, does not make a separate investigation of the
23. Cf BRUCE RUSSETr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993) (exploring the peaceful
relationships among democracies).
24. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 21, at 225 ("Liberal states are as aggressive and war prone as

any other form of government or society in their relations with nonliberal states."). But see James
L. Ray, R.J Rummel's UnderstandingConflict and War 8-10 (Feb. 1995) (on file with the author)
(discussing literature tending to show that democracies may indeed be less conflict-prone than
other types of regimes); see also JAMES L. RAY, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
(1995).
25. Doyle, supra note 21, at 212.
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criterion of legislative constraint on the executive, apart from its use to
assign states to either the "liberal" or "illiberal" category.
While Doyle analyzes the democratic variable as a dichotomy,

other commentators use three or more categories. Still others rank states
in terms of scores assigned to various democratic attributes (such as the
percentage of the adults enjoying suffrage, or the extent of freedoms of
speech or press). 26 Other researchers, while examining whether polities
that undergo transformation from nondemocratic to democratic regimetypes (or vice versa) are more or less likely to get involved in conflict
during periods of democratization, have drawn attention to the destabilizing potential of turbulent transitions.27 Like Doyle's work, much of
this literature treats substantial constraints over the executive in the foreign policy field (whether emanating from the legislature or otherwise)

as among the factors relevant to ascertaining and/or ranking a state's
"democratic" credentials; the extent of judicial independence is also

sometimes factored in.2 s Yet none of these inquiries gets very far in
analyzing the extent to which structural features of different democratic
types correlate with lesser levels of violence, especially with the initia-

tion of violence. In particular, there is little explicit discussion of the
constraining role of different modalities of controls on the war-initiating
powers of the executive branch.
Looking at the problem through the lens of comparative constitutional law challenges us to test the hypothesis that the phenomenon of
26. Among investigators using graduated, composite, or compound measures are RUSSETr,
supra note 23 (creating a composite index and classifying states as "democratic," "anocratic," or
"autocratic" based on index scores); Ted R. Gurr et al., The Transformationof the Western State,
25 STUDIES INCOMP.INT'L DEV.73 (Spring 1990) (measuring "democracy" and "autocracy" with
values from 0 to 10); and R.J. Rummel, Libertarianism and International Violence, 27 J.
CONFLICT RESOL.27, 27 (1983) (testing propositions including "the more freedom that individuals
have in a state, the less the state engages in foreign violence," using ordinal rankings of degrees of
freedom).
27. See generally Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratizationand the Danger of
War, 20 INT'L SEcURImT 5 (1995).
28. One of Gurr's components, for example, is the institutionalized constraints that exist on
the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities: the greater
the constraints, the more democratic the polity. Gurr, supra note 26, at 83; see also Steve Chan,
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ...Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
617, 630 (1984) (setting up a dichotomy under which a country is categorized as "more free" only
if it has at least a partially effective legislature to check the executive); Mansfield & Snyder, supra
note 27 (conducting separate analyses based on a composite index and on three component
indices, one of which is a measure of institutionalized constraints on executive decisionmaking);
Melvin Small & J. David Singer, The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965, 1
JERUSALEM J. INT'L RELS. 50, 54 (1976) (categorizing regimes using criteria such as "a legislative
body that is . . .dominant over or at least equal to the executive"); cf.Zeev Maoz & Nasrin
Abdolali, Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 17
(1989) (analyzing independent variables including "independence of executive" and "distribution
of authority").
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democracies initiating violence against nondemocracies might be
explained partly in terms of imperfect subordination of executive war
powers to constitutional controls. To the extent that executive warmaking is constitutionally constrained and made subject to prior legislative
approval, democracies might become more pacific, not only in their relations with other democracies but with any type of regime. Although this
hypothesis remains untested and unproved, important normative implications would flow from its being proved. Among those would be that it
is not enough to favor democratization in the sense of periodic electoral
validation of the government, or liberalization in the sense of respect for
human rights and individual autonomy; rather, attention must also be
given to whether particular political structures and systems of constitutional control might be more effective than others in checking the warmaking potential of the executive branch.
The role of the American President as initiator of several conflicts
during the 1980s suggests some of the issues to be explored in attempting to understand conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies.
U.S. involvement in Central America in the mid-1980s, and U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, are examples of
imperfect constitutional control on the part of a democratic state that
initiated conflict with nondemocratic states. As for the Central American controversy, the Reagan Administration (or at least some of its key
figures) found ways to circumvent explicit congressional prohibitions on
U.S. attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government or to provoke a
military exchange with Nicaragua, 29 and in this way (among others)
undermined the proper functioning of our constitutional system of government. 30 The Reagan and Bush Administrations acted without congressional authorization in undertaking the invasions of Grenada and
Panama, even though the nature of the operations and the likelihood of
combat implicated the constitutional prerogatives of Congress. The
courts declined to articulate the boundaries of lawful executive action
and left the President essentially free to implement an expansive view of
his own constitutional powers.3 '
Whether the U.S. constitutional system ultimately worked in each
instance to implement a commitment to constitutional control of war
powers is a matter for fair debate. My purpose in this brief comment is
to identify the issues rather than resolve them and to suggest the impor29. For discussion of these and other
appropriated funds, see Peter Raven-Hansen
Commander in Chief 80 VA. L. REv. 833,
30. See KoH, supra note 15.
31. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558
(D.C. Cir. 1983).

congressionally imposed restrictions on the use of
& William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
857-69 (1994).
F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355
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tance of exploring different modalities of constitutional governance as
they succeeded (or failed) to halt initiation of violence between democratic and nondemocratic states. This inquiry is especially pertinent
regarding mature democracies, which have devised varying methods for
controlling executive actions in the domestic and foreign spheres. Once
these variations in constitutional control are identified and explained,
with attention to successes as well as failures, we will have a better
understanding of the relationship between democracy and peace. We
may also be able to confine the proposition that "democracies are not
inherently more pacific than nondemocracies" to a subset of democratic
countries with identifiable anomalies or pathologies in their constitutional control structures.
IV.

THE GULF WAR COALITION AND THE CASES OF GERMANY
AND JAPAN

Americans are well aware that in January 1991, Congress conducted a historic debate that resulted in legislation authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq, in accordance with resolutions of
the U.N. Security Council.32 Less well known in this country are the

corresponding deliberations that occurred in democratic parliaments in
London, Paris, Ottawa, Rome, Madrid, Canberra, and elsewhere that
also produced support for multinational military action. The constitutional significance of these decisions varies considerably from country
to country, with some of the parliamentary actions largely reflecting
political endorsement of decisions already put into operation by the
executive, and others signaling a greater potential for legislative control
over military decisionmaking.
The parliamentary deliberations in Bonn and Tokyo were not at all
of the rubberstamp sort. Although Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister
Kaifu had staked considerable political capital on policies entailing a not
insignificant degree of tangible support for the multinational coalition,
they were reined in by parliaments with rather different interpretations
of constitutional limits on military participation.33 These events led to
developments of import for the present project: In Japan in 1992, the
legislature passed a peace-keeping operations law that both enabled and
32. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541) (1991).
33. In Japan, the government withdrew a bill that would have enabled Self-Defense Forces to

support the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. The bill was withdrawn without a vote in the face
of heated opposition, which was partly grounded in constitutional objections. See Akiho Shibata,
Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation and Recent Developments in U.N. Operations, 19 YALE J.
INT'L L. 307, 314-15 (1994).
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constrained Japanese involvement in U.N. peacekeeping in Cambodia;34
and in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court in a landmark decision
delineated the conditions under which participation in U.N.-authorized
interventions could proceed. 5
In Japan, the fundamental war powers principle is expressed in
Article 9 of the 1946 constitution, which provides as follows under the
heading "Renunciation of War":
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.36
American occupation authorities wrote the Japanese constitution to further the plan sketched by Allied leaders at Potsdam for a thorough
demilitarization and pacification of Japan. 37 A literal reading of the constitution, which was drafted in English and then translated into Japanese,
seems to preclude maintenance of any military capability whatsoever.
But at several points in Japanese postwar history, decisions have been
taken and understandings reached that have allowed Japan to remain a
substantial military power, albeit in a passive posture; recently, however,
active involvement in collective military efforts has become possible.
The pivotal points have included: (1) the creation of the Self-Defense
Forces in the early 1950s, (2) the ratification and subsequent renewal of
the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, and (3) the reassessment of Japanese war powers precipitated by U.N.-related developments
of the 1990s, including the Persian Gulf War (in which Japanese
involvement was minimal), 38 and the U.N. transitional authority in Cambodia (in which Japanese peacekeepers had a tangible presence).39
34. See id. at 308 (discussing the Law Concerning Cooperation in U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations and Other Operations, 1992) [hereinafter Peacekeeping Operations Law].
35. Judgment of July 12, 1994, 90 BVerfGE 286 (Ger.).
36. KENPO [Constitution] art. IX (Japan), in 8 Constitutions of the Countries of the World 16
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990).
37. For a cogent rendering of the drafting history, with valuable references, see Andrzej
Rapaczynski, BibliographicalEssay, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS 405, supra note 6, at
429-33.
38. Two months after the end of the war, Japan dispatched a minesweeper to the Gulf. This
was the first extra-regional deployment of the Japanese military since World War II. See Steven
R. Weisman, Breaking Tradition, Japan Sends Flotilla to Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991, at
Al1; Shibata, supra note 33, at 316-18.
39. Japanese contributions included a ground unit of 600 troops and several hundred troops in
other capacities, including naval and air transport and civilian monitoring. Shibata, supra note 33,
at 308 n.6.
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With respect to judicial interpretation of ambiguous constitutional
provisions concerning war powers, the Japanese experience has been
more like the American experience than like the German experience,

which will be discussed below. Except for two lower court decisions
that were later reversed,4 0 Japanese courts have avoided ruling on consti-

tutional challenges to sensitive security policies. Using a version of the
"political question doctrine" and related techniques similar to those
applied by U.S. courts, the Japanese Supreme Court (like its American
counterpart) has refrained from articulating limits on the government's

military powers.4" By deferring to the political organs of government
and expressing a reluctance to interfere with the decisions of those
organs in the security sphere, Japanese courts have given the political
branches broad discretion in carrying out military functions.4 z

This is not to say that constitutional control mechanisms are absent
in Japan, but rather that they have taken a largely nonjudicial form.
With respect to Article 9, as with other constitutional questions, the Japanese judiciary is not in any essential sense the "last resort," but merely
one forum among several in which to make constitutional arguments.
The role of Japanese courts may be merely incidental with respect to
important political questions. The real constitutional debate occurs in

the legislature, in newspapers, and in gathering places.
Seen in this light, the Japanese Legislature, or Diet, is the forum in

which Article 9 has acquired most of its contemporary meaning. The
40. See JOHN M. MAxx, COURT AND CONsTrrTroN IN JAPAN 298-361 (1964) (discussing the
Sunakawa case, of 1959, in which a Tokyo trial judge ruled that the presence of U.S. forces in
Japan was unconstitutional); James E. Auer, Article Nine of Japan's Constitution, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 182 (1990) (discussing the Naganumacase, of 1973, in which a trial judge
ruled that the Self-Defense Forces were unconstitutional).
41. See MAri, supra note 40, at 348. Summarizing the Japanese Supreme Court majority's
decision in the Sunakawa case, one judge wrote:
the Security Treaty possesses a highly political nature of great importance to the
very existence of our country; that a decision as to the unconstitutionality of such
treaty, as a matter of principle, does not involve a decision of the judicial courts;
and that, accordingly, the constitutional review of such a treaty, unless it is
recognized as being "clearly and obviously unconstitutional or invalid," lies outside
the scope of constitutional review.
Id. See also the alternative translation in Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court
Upon Questions of Constitutionality, No. 4, at 3, 6 (available in Columbia Law School Library)
for the following passage:
unless the said treaty is obviously unconstitutional and void, it falls outside the
purview of the power ofjudicial review granted to the court. It is proper to construe
that the question of the determination of its constitutionality should be left primarily
to the Cabinet which has the power to conclude treaties and the Diet which has the
power to ratify them; and ultimately to the political consideration of the people
with whom rest the sovereign power of the nation.
42. See Auer, supra note 40, at 182 (discussing the subsequent history of the Naganuma
case).
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Diet, in the 1950s, decided that the creation of the Self-Defense Forces
could be reconciled with a view of the constitution which was within the
realm of plausibility.43 Since then the Diet has engaged in a continual
reassessment of what contemporary constitutional consciousness
requires. In the 1990s, the Diet has acted as a substantial check on executive power, as the history of the government's proposals for action during the Gulf War shows. The enactment in 1992 of a statutory
framework to govern cooperation with U.N. peace-keeping operations
reflects another legislative act of constitutional interpretation.44 In my
work-in-progress, I am examining the very real constraints rooted in
Article 9, as interpreted by the Japanese Diet, as an important instance of
legislative control over executive war powers.
The German example illustrates the role of a judicial organ exercising constitutional control and the democratic theory of legislative control of war powers. For purposes of comparative constitutional analysis,
a recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court is highly
instructive. That decision interprets the relevant provisions of the German constitution as applied to German participation in military actions
under the auspices of the United Nations. 45 The German form of judicial constitutional supervision is quite different from the American
model in many respects. It shows, inter alia, that judicial organs can
play a constructive role in giving contemporary meaning to constitutional war powers provisions. As Thomas Franck cogently documented
in his book criticizing the U.S. political question doctrine,4 6 German
courts, and the German Federal Constitutional Court in particular, do not
shrink from addressing war-and-peace decisions, but rather confront
them on the merits. The results are laudable: The polity as a whole
benefits from understanding the legitimacy of the actions of the political
branches (or, where relevant, the constitutional limits applicable to such
actions), and the political branches themselves draw strength from that
process of legitimation.
The reasoning of the German decision on U.N. peacekeeping is perhaps even more pertinent to this essay than the fact that a decision was
rendered on the merits. The German constitution embodies a renunciation of the power to initiate war but preserves the power to engage in
self-defense of German territory and the territory of its allies, and to
43. In the words of the Supreme Court in Sunakawa, this interpretation was at least not
"clearly and obviously unconstitutional." See MAicr, supra note 40, at -.
44. It is notable that the Peacekeeping Operations Law itself requires that the Diet approve in
advance and periodically review the participation of Japanese troops in U.N. or other peacekeeping operations. See Shibata, supra note 33, at 324-25.
45. See Judgment of July 12, 1994, 90 BVerfGE 286 (Ger.).
46. THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONs/JuDIcIAL ANSWERS 107-25 (1992).
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enter into collective security arrangements. 7 Previous judicial decisions
in Germany had dealt with German participation in collective security
efforts under NATO, such as through military bases and the emplacement of certain controversial weapons on German territory.48 But as of
the time of the Persian Gulf War, the question of the constitutionality of
participation in U.N.-authorized military actions had not been authoritatively resolved.
The 1994 judicial decision arose from divisions within Germany
over the constitutional permissibility of German participation in the multinational peace-keeping (or peace enforcement) actions in the former
Yugoslavia and Somalia. The substance of the decision allows Germany
to play a significant role in certain collective efforts, subject to advance
authorization by the parliament, or Bundestag. The Federal Constitutional Court wrote, "The Constitution obliges the Federal Government to
seek enabling agreement by the German Bundestag, as a rule in advance,
before committing the armed forces to action."4 9 The court thus gave
particular application in the military sphere to the "democracy principle"
of German constitutional law. The court in previous decisions stated
that that principle required parliamentary endorsement of certain international commitments.50 The democracy principle is an "unassailable"
core element of German constitutionalism: It cannot be altered even by
constitutional amendment.5" Significantly, the court stressed that only a
legitimizing decision by the Bundestag could satisfy the democracy
principle with respect to military engagements.
The court's insistence on legislative endorsement of the constitutional validity of German participation in U.N.-authorized military
actions warrants close comparison to the corresponding question in constitutional discourse elsewhere. 2 This is one of many pieces of evi47. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] arts. 26, 87a, 87b.
48. These have included decisions on the Pershing II and cruise missile controversies. For
discussion, see FRANCK, supra note 46, at 117-18.
49. Judgment of July 12, 1994, 90 BVerfGE 286 (Ger.), quoted in Craig R. Whitney, Court
Permits German Troops a Foreign Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at Al, A13.
50. For the Federal Constitutional Court's explanation of the democracy principle as applied
to German participation in the Maastricht Treaty, see Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993 (Brunner v.
European Union Treaty), translatedin 69 COMMON MKT. L. RaP. 57, 84-88 (1994).
51. Under Article 79(3) of the German Constitution, certain basic principles of
constitutionalism, including democracy, rule of law, and separation of powers, are "unassailable;"
they cannot be changed even by constitutional amendment. The principle of democracy as an
unassailable principle was discussed in Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 50, at 84-88. For
an explanation of the theory of an "unalterable core" of constitutional principles, see Gregory H.
Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 18-20 (1995).
52. Franck, who strongly endorses the concept ofjudicial control of executive decisions in the
military sphere, would exclude the U.S. Congress from the constitutional control function in a
U.N.-authorized military conflict. Compare Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action
in Lieu of War, 85 Am.J. INT'L L. 63 (1991) with Glennon, supra note 19, at 88 (differing views
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dence showing a worldwide trend toward subordinating executive war
power to advance legislative authorization.
V.

CONCLUSION

A comparative study will, I hope, generate new insight for the
ongoing controversy in the United States about the roles of the President
and the Congress in war-and-peace decisionmaking. Constitutional
discourse about war powers has come to seem increasingly sterile, with
little possibility of breaking the stalemate between advocates of meaningful congressional participation and defenders of presidential authority. On the side of a renewal of congressional power are a finite number
of eloquent but well-worn quotes from the framers; on the executive's
side are growing numbers of instances (now more than 200) in which
presidents are said to have acted in their own way, rather than in the
framers' or Congress's way. Compounding the stalemate is the
irresolvability of fundamental problems of constitutional theory, such as
the significance to be attributed to the intentions and understandings of
the founding generation, as against a body of contemporary practice
apparently at odds with originalist conceptions. Judicial resolution is
unlikely, at least for as long as U.S. courts continue their course of
eschewing decision on the merits when presidential war powers are
challenged.
The framers' choices made for the Constitution of 1787 reflect their
convictions that no one person, or body of persons, should have sole
responsibility for deciding to go to war; that the person who would be
crowned with the laurel of victory has the greatest temptation toward
war and therefore should be denied the decision-making prerogative;
that those who hold the purse strings should determine at the outset
whether to incur the costs of conflict; and that the war power should rest
with the most representative organ. Those choices may indeed embody
the height of wisdom for the framers' time; but if the framers' insights
are to command respect in a world dramatically changed, they must be
validated anew for our own generation and for the generations to follow.
A comparative examination of war powers across a variety of democratic societies can contribute a new dimension to the U.S. constitutional debate. If worldwide trends are toward greater constitutional
control over executive war powers, as manifested through legislative
supervision and some measure of judicial review for validity, then the
on whether congressional involvement is called for). At the time of the Gulf War, however, many
U.S. constitutional lawyers believed that the President was constitutionally barred from initiating
major combat without congressional authorization. See, e.g., Memorandum Amicus Curiae,
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), reprintedin 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257 (1991).
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U.S. experience must be reinterpreted. Undoubtedly, the framers'
insights of 1787 helped set those trends in motion and provided a model
that many other democracies have emulated. It is ironic that post-World
War II American presidents have advanced sweeping claims for their
own military prerogatives, even while working to instill notions of constitutional control over executive power in other polities. A global comparative study can put the American experience in perspective and help
us understand what aspects of that experience are (and arguably should
remain) unique.
I invite Professor Ely to join me on the quest to understand and
strengthen these crossnational trends. Perhaps our next symposium can
be held in Moscow, where the image of a strong executive ordering a
military assault on the stronghold of the legislature (there known as the
White House) gives new meaning to Edward Corwin's famous image of
an "invitation to struggle" for the privilege of control over foreign policy. 3 Several years ago I was in Moscow at a time of optimism that the
then-ascendant elites of the Gorbachev period had come to understand
that the worst misadventures of Soviet rule (including the invasions of
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan) had come about precisely because of
the centralization of war-making power in too few hands. 4 The recent
events in Chechnya indicate that, in present-day Russia, structural guarantees against excessive concentration of war powers in one person's
hands are nonexistent or at least nonfunctioning. The same events also
illustrate the broader relevance of one of the propositions Harold Koh
has offered at this symposium, 5 which I reformulate as follows: Presidents who are weak in their domestic political posture, but who believe
themselves to possess very potent and essentially unchecked war powers, are the most dangerous of all.

53. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 171 (4th rev. ed 1957) (the Constitution is "an
invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy").
54. For references to condemnation by legislative authority of some of the Soviet abuses, see
Damrosch, supra note 9, at 94-97.
55. See Harold H. Koh, War and Responsibility in the Dole/GingrichCongress, 50 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1995).

